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Renate Blickle
SUBSISTENCE and property." This paper looks at an enduringsubject from a Central European perspective. It is an historio-graphical variation of an old matter of dispute: to whom do the
goods of the world legitimately belong, to those who need them, or to
those who possess them legally, but do not need them? In this paper
"subsistence" stands for the legitimizing power of the idea of "need,"
and "property" for justification through an appeal to freedom. In theory
more than two thousand years ago the question was already answered in
favor of the primacy of property. When, in a fable related by Xenophon,
an older boy traded his small coat for the large one owned by a small
boy, and satisfied both of their needs, Xenophon condemned him. For,
in doing so, the older boy violated the law of property.1 In practice, the
legal sensitivities of most people naturally would have led them to
resolve this difficulty in another manner. Even in the cultures of the
North Atlantic, where today the primacy of property is vehemently
defended and is considered the expression of individual freedom in its
highest material form, people chose a different solution in earlier centuries.
Paternalism in England, the forerunner of the European "Possessive-
Market-Society," according to Macpherson, was pushed back by liberalism
only two hundred years ago.2 Elsewhere Polanyi's "Great Transformation"
occurred at an even slower pace.3
The developments which pointed in the direction of modernity have,
in my opinion, aroused decidedly more interest in the historical literature
This paper was presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association,
27-30 December 1987, in Washington D.C. It was translated by Thomas Robisheaux of
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
1. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, ed. A. Goodwin (1879), 1:3.
2. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(Oxford, 1962).
3. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York/Toronto, 1944).
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than did the understanding of the structural framework of the old order.
To mention only one catchword, capitalism, and its formation and its
peculiarities, has fascinated scholars. The developments which came
before it, however, often have been treated only insofar as they explain
the origins of capitalism or as they delineate more clearly the evolution of
modern conditions which are thought to be more interesting. In the
work of Werner Sombart, for example, one finds the appropriate and
striking "concept of subsistence"—the "Idee der Nahrung"—which for
him was the governing principle of precapitalist economic regulations.4
But this idea was obviously more a product of intuition than analysis. He
did not describe it or develop it further, but instead used it to serve his
immediate purposes: The "old" idea of subsistence served Sombart
primarily as a way to identify the "new" signs of capitalism.
A counterpart to this position—equally close to the subject of this
paper—can be found in the work of E. P. Thompson.5 He focused
precisely on the traditional patterns of thought of the English lower class.
Their attitudes were deeply influenced by the "ideal of needs." Thomp-
son characterized them with his well-known phrase, "the moral econ-
omy of the crowd," and he interpreted it as a remnant of the older social
concept of paternalism, which had embraced the whole of society, and
which the authorities had been obligated to support and promote.
Thompson based his views on an analysis of social unrest. I see this
approach as exemplary in elucidating the key social ideas of the past. My
own reflections on this theme of "subsistence and property" (that is, of a
social order legitimized either by an appeal to the "principle of needs" or
to the "notion of freedom") also rest on sources left behind by earlier
social and political conflicts. In this case they are the disputes in Bavaria
between the subjects, communally organized, and the feudal authorities
of the principality. My first thesis is this: The study of "popular con-
flicts" demonstrates the importance of the key social value of a "fitting
subsistence," a concept which is to be found in the sources as the term
Hausnotdurft, or "domestic necessity." This social value expressed a
fundamental concept of order which received its legitimacy from the
"principle of needs" and which was rooted in positive law and applicable
to all social orders. My second thesis suggests that the decline of the
"principle of needs" after 1700 was related to the development of liberal
ideas, especially liberal conceptions of property.6
4. Werner Sombart, Der modeme Kapitalismits (Munich/Leipzig, 1928), vol. 1, 2d ed.,
Die vorkapitalistische Wirtschqft.
5. E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century," Past and Present 1 (1971): 76-131. Idem, "The Moral Economy Reviewed,"
idem, Customs in Common (London, 1991): 259-351.
6. For more detailed references see Renate Blickle, "Hausnotdurft. Ein Fundamental-
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I want, first of all, to give you a brief, but hopefully also a relatively
concrete, look at the existence and the social power of the idea of the
term "domestic necessity," necessitas domestica in Latin.
To a certain extent the concept of "domestic necessity" can be seen at
work in its role within the context of labor services. The performance of
labor services provided by far the most common occasion for dispute
between the communes and their noble or ecclesiastical lords. Toward
the end of the eighteenth century, according to the information of one
contemporary, there were virtually no nobles in the land who were not
involved in a dispute over labor services. These labor services were not
fixed in number or kind; the number of work days a lord could demand
from his subjects was nowhere clearly laid down. That does not mean,
however, that such demands could be made arbitrarily or without re-
straint. The yardstick for measuring labor services in Bavaria was
"domestic necessity."
The Bavarian lawcode of 1616 defined the normal labor services in the
territory in the following way: Labor services include those services and
work that subjects must perform manually or with their draft animals for
the "domestic necessity" of their respective lords. And it goes on to
stipulate that this labor was permissible only insofar as it did not hinder
subjects from securing "their own subsistence and that of those depen-
dent on them." The leading legal commentary on this lawcode summed
up all of the provisions concerning labor services in the following way:
"In the end the general rule is set down that peasants who provide
unfixed labor services should be treated so that they can still work their
fields and meet their •domestic necessity.'"
In the legal provisions concerning labor services the concept of
"domestic necessity"—or rather "subsistence"—was used as a standard
both in the form of the "domestic necessity" of the lord, and also the
"domestic necessity" of the peasant. Between these two lay the range of
permissible labor services. The standard for the "domestic necessity" of
the lord was supposed to limit labor services to those meeting the needs
of the lord's house; the standard for the "domestic necessity" of the
peasant was supposed to guarantee that the peasant farm still could
muster the labor power necessary for existence. I would like to call
attention here to two broad-ranging consequences of this "concept of
needs." "Needs" as a norm were limited to that which was necessary for
rccht in dcr altstandischen Ordnung Baycrns," in Grund- und Freiheitsrechte von der standi-
schen zur spatburgerlichen Gesellschaft, ed. Guntcr Birtsch (Gottingen, 1987), 42-62, and
Rcnatc Blicklc, "Nahrung und Eigcntum als Katcgoricn in dcr standischen Gesellschaft,"
in Standische Gesellschaft und soziale Mobilitat, ed. Winfricd Schulze (Munich, 1988), 73-93.
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life; and, at the same time, as a social value, it justified these necessities.
The need requirements of the household were essential for existence, and
must therefore be provided for. It erected, on the one hand, a protective
wall against poverty and, on the other, another one against excess, a term
implying above all else usury and luxury.
Conflicts over labor services in Bavaria provide a glimpse into the
origins, the practical application, and the effectiveness of this concept. As
early as the fifteenth century one can see that the "domestic necessity" of
the peasant was used to restrict the labor demands of the lords. Conflicts
over the demand for forced servant labor in the households of the lords
were resolved by assuring peasants that they did not have to send their
children to work for the lord if they "require[d them] for their work and
needs at home." In the sixteenth century the limitation of labor services
to those who met the needs of the lord's household played an important
role. The basic principle—that a peasant must work only for the lord's
"needs," and not for his advantage—became evident in these conflicts,
and was eventually written into the lawcode of 1616 as "the standard of
domestic necessity" that I cited earlier. Nevertheless it was still necessary
to oversee compliance with the law. Numerous examples from every
century are known to us showing how the nobility and the clergy who
resided on the land and on their estates attempted to expand their own
agricultural enterprises with the help of labor services. Where this did not
happen, where, on the one hand, numerous domains remained modest in
size, and, on the other, the mass of the peasantry remained intact, the
standard of "domestic necessity," the concept of a "fitting subsistence"
for the lord and for the subject, was responsible. This social standard
worked with equal effectiveness in restricting the expansion of the lords'
craft industries. Products that were not produced for household con-
sumption, but were intended from the start for sale and for the market,
could not be produced with labor services. In practice the boundaries
were very vague, and, at the same time, extremely difficult to draw. Let
us take a typical Bavarian example: the brewing of beer by princely and
ecclesiastical breweries. As the disputes with the authorities suggest,
lords who brewed beer succumbed continuously and easily to the temp-
tation to require their peasants to provide carting services to transport
barley, hops, and wood, or to render similar work in the form of labor
services, since precisely this type of labor counted as normal and legal
labor services so long as it served the household needs of the lord. The
peasants' ever watchful eye and readiness to enter into a dispute were
therefore preconditions for the practical application of the principle of
"domestic necessity."
As a social norm the principle of "needs" had two adversaries: profit—
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notoriously and quickly denounced as usury—and luxury, that is con-
sumption beyond one's needs. Since the norm already implied a standard
of "one house," luxury naturally was judged to be everything which
exceeded the needs of this single unit. The labor services that a noble lord
demanded in order to build or to provision a second house, such as a
residence in the town or a pleasure castle, were therefore refused, and
also legally forbidden with arguments against superfluous luxury. As one
can imagine, the boundary between "domestic necessity" and luxury
could literally run right through the middle of the lord's gardens. If one
planted a castle garden for "such things as were needed daily in the kitchen,"
certain labor services could then be rendered. If a lord were "to make a
pleasure garden" out of it, however, his subjects were not obligated to work
there, or so the council of the prince determined in 1594.
The relationship between labor services and "domestic necessity" that
I have briefly sketched illustrates the development and function of the
idea of a "fitting subsistence" by way of only a few points and examples.
One can also discover "domestic necessity" as a norm, as the basis for
legal claims and rights in the regulation of common fields and forests, or
in the economic and sociopolitical measures of the Bavarian princes. In
princely mandates of the fifteenth century the principle of "domestic
necessity" was already a privileged one and applicable to all estates. The
principle applied to "every countryman, whether of high or low estate,
who had a house on the land," that is, to prelates, nobles, officials,
townsmen, or peasants.
To recapitulate I would like to emphasize five points.
1. The term "domestic necessity" described in Bavaria a legal norm
which distributed economic resources in this society of scarcity accord-
ing to the principle of needs.
2. The principle of needs had validity as a legitimate legal claim, and
was expressed characteristically as "needs," or Notbedarf. It could pro-
vide social legitimacy to peasants who resisted the authorities in the early
modern period.
3. The actual scope and content of the "principle of needs" was bound
up with the concept of the house. Neither the individual nor a privileged
estate or class, but the household community, the house—all houses in
the land—could appeal to the principle of "needs." Insofar as this was
true the social order of Bavaria rested on foundations that were egalitar-
ian and not consistent with the society of orders.
4. This seeming equality of all households in principle did not contra-
dict the fact that one's needs were to be measured according to the status
of the head of the household and the size of his house. Needs were to be
"fitting," or proportional. Every peasant or noble did not have the same
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needs. "The standard is to be applied," the commentary on the law code
reads, "so that the bird is to be measured by the nest."
5. The norm of "domestic necessity" subsumed unto itself the cate-
gories of suitableness and equality. It combined the hierarchical concep-
tion inherent in a society of orders with the egalitarian right of existence
within the framework of the traditional European order.
In reality the form that "domestic necessity" actually took in Bavaria
was a product of disputes carried out by major social groups after the
fourteenth century. At first it was based on only a vaguely elaborated set
of values citing the notion of need. The zenith of its power to legitimize
social relationships came in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By
the end of the seventeenth century there were already signs that its star
was beginning to fade. Its decline was directly connected to the rise of
liberal thought within the constellation of social values.
In the second, and shorter, part of my article, I would like to show you
this slow change from a concept of order based on "needs" to one rooted
in the idea of "freedom." I want to describe for you three scenes, three
situations, one each from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
century. In each of them I will contrast the idea of "domestic necessity"
with the then current conceptions of property.
Our first example from the sixteenth century looks at a dispute be-
tween the townsmen of the market town of Altomunster and their lord,
the monastery of Altomunster. The townsmen had lodged a complaint
against the monastery with the prince of Bavaria because the abbess, in
the townsmen's opinion, had chopped down and sold off too many trees
from the neighboring woods. The town had the right to meet its needs
for supplies of wood from this forest; the monastery was described as the
owner of the forest. The townsmen based their complaint on the argu-
ment that the monastery, through its tree-cutting, endangered their
"domestic necessity," their "fitting subsistence." Against the monas-
tery's right to the property they opposed their own right to a secure
supply of wood. The townsmen's right to have their needs met, there-
fore, restricted the property rights of the monastery, and not simply in
the material sense of reducing the monastery's share of the wood, but
also in a categorical sense by rejecting the idea of the monastery's right to
dispose freely of its own property. In the sixteenth century the "principle
of needs" dominated the "principle of property."
In the second example about one hundred years later, around 1680, a
shift was evident in the balance of power between the "idea of needs"
and the "idea of property." The parties in the dispute were the peasantry
of Ammcrgau and their lord, the monastery of Ettal. The Ammergauers
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also intervened against the felling of trees by the monastery in a nearby
forest, but they argued differently from the townsmen of Altomiinster a
century earlier. They did not defend their needs for wood, but instead
asserted that they were the owners of the forest. The Ammergauers
demanded that the forest should remain, as they put it, "at their free
disposal." They wanted to manage it with "complete freedom." Their
argumentation and choice of words in the dispute over the forest shows
that they had overcome the traditional concept of property, and de-
veloped a new concept of property resembling the modern idea of
private property in all of its essential features. The monastic authorities
argued otherwise. Ettal asserted its rights as the owner of the forest, to be
sure, but it understood that to mean something different from the claim
of the Ammergauers. The monastery clung to the traditional conception
of property. It was satisfied with that older form of imperfect ownership
which was still limited by the claims of their subjects based on need and
their use rights to the property. This did not alter the fact that the
dominant social ideas had changed before 1700 as the idea of property
found broader acceptance.
The third example in this small cycle of illustrations of the theme of
"subsistence and property" depicts the social dominance of the idea of
property in the middle of the eighteenth century. The opponents this
time in a dispute over a forest were the town of Ohlstadt and its lord, the
monastery of Schlehdorf. Both of them asserted that they were the
owners of the forest, and both had left behind them the old framework
of thought that supported incomplete or divided property rights. The
commune thought that the monastery was not due even "the smallest
right" to the forest. The monastery likewise held that it alone was the
unrestricted and sole owner of the property, since, as the provost argued
learnedly, "Duo domini in uno eodemque subjecto consistere non pos-
sunt." Securing the peasants' need for wood, meeting the needs of the
household, appeared only as a marginal problem in this dispute. The
provost recommended to the peasants that they petition him for wood
when they wanted it for "domestic necessity." The right to secure "the
household's domestic necessity" appears to have lost its power. In any
event, the idea of property had been freed from the shackles which the
principle of need had imposed upon it. The solution to the Ohlstadt
dispute shows up the new situation clearly: The disputed forest was
surveyed and then divided; the claimants, the monastery and the com-
mune were each awarded a part as their "own private property," as one
now called it. After 1756 the new private owners disposed over their
own parcels of forest with complete freedom.
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The background of the conflicts described here was shaped by a
concept of "divided property," i.e., an ideal construction which was
intended to circumscribe the relationship of men and land in legal terms.
According to its origins property was ownership of real estate, and for
this reason the locus classicus of "divided property" was the farmstead.
Thus a farmstead in early modern Bavaria usually belonged to two
proprietors, each with different property rights: The seignorial lord was
considered to be the "superior proprietor" (dominus directus), and the
peasant was seen as the "using owner" or "inferior proprietor" (dominus
utilis). Attempts were made to see the legal status of forest land in
analogy to these property rights, but in many places the rights to forests
remained undefined until the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. Grad-
ual changes of meaning that occurred in the concept of property were
developed more easily in the area of the imprecise rights to forest land
than in the area of the written and contractual fixed rights related to
farmsteads. New developments can be recognized earlier here.
In this phase of change both owners of the cooperatively owned
property strove to eliminate the other partner. Each wanted to enjoy sole
proprietorship, free from encroachments by the other, and to be able to
dispose of property freely. Around the middle of the eighteenth century
this goal was reached. At that time, as demonstrated by the example of
Ohlstadt, the property both parties were contending for—the forest
land—was parceled up and the actual parcels were portioned to the
contestants. From this point on the rights of both proprietors were no
longer qualitatively different; now they were identical. Between pro-
prietors of this new sort were no shared claims to property and no
mutual rights or duties. The traces of "public authority" which were
visible as a kind of lordship right in the "superior proprietorship" had
disappeared. Property as a private right did not include any kind of
responsibility toward another person. It was the legitimate right of its
owner regardless of the needs of any others.
In the nineteenth century this form of private property became pre-
dominant. The civil individual saw his property as a material guaranty
and a manifestation of his freedom, and elevated it into a sacrosanct
human right. Of course this does not mean that the controversy over the
concept of property and the right to subsistence—that is the right to
satisfy the basic needs of daily life—was laid to rest once and for all. This
controversy is being continued today in the sphere of human rights.
Added to the liberal rights of citizens were the basic social rights, the
so-called human rights, of the second generation. In the twentieth cen-
tury even the liberal concept of private property itself was no longer
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beyond bounds. Thus the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many requires that property be used, not by the individual for himself
alone, but "also for the benefit of all": "Property obligates."7
BERN, SWITZERLAND
7. Basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949, article 14, paragraph
2: "Eigentum verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soil zugleich dem Wohle der Allgemeinheit
dienen."
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